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Empathy is critical to the quality of our relationships with others and plays an important role
in life satisfaction and well-being. The scientific investigation of empathy has focused on
characterizing its cognitive and neural substrates, and has pointed to the importance of a
network of brain regions involved in emotional experience and perspective taking (e.g., ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex, amygdala, anterior insula, cingulate). While the hippocampus
has rarely been the focus of empathy research, the hallmark properties of the hippocam-
pal declarative memory system (e.g., representational flexibility, relational binding, on-line
processing capacity) make it well-suited to meet some of the crucial demands of empa-
thy, and a careful investigation of this possibility could make a significant contribution to
the neuroscientific understanding of empathy. The present study is a preliminary investi-
gation of the role of the hippocampal declarative memory system in empathy. Participants
were three patients (1 female) with focal, bilateral hippocampal (HC) damage and severe
declarative memory impairments and three healthy demographically matched comparison
participants. Empathy was measured as a trait through a battery of gold standard question-
naires and through on-line ratings and prosocial behavior in response to a series of empathy
inductions. Patients with hippocampal amnesia reported lower cognitive and emotional trait
empathy than healthy comparison participants. Unlike healthy comparison participants, in
response to the empathy inductions hippocampal patients reported no increase in empa-
thy ratings or prosocial behavior. The results provide preliminary evidence for a role for
hippocampal declarative memory in empathy.
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INTRODUCTION
The scientific investigation of empathy has become a corner-
stone of the study of social cognition (Preston and de Waal, 2002;
Adolphs, 2003). Indeed, empathy, or the ability to understand and
share the feelings of others, is integral to the quality of our relation-
ships with others and plays an important role in relationship sat-
isfaction and subjective well-being (Davis and Oathout, 1987; Wei
et al., 2011). Converging methods point to a network of structures
that contribute to empathy including the bilateral orbitofrontal
and ventromedial prefrontal cortices (vmPFC), anterior cingu-
late, anterior insula, and amygdala (Eslinger, 1998; Mesulam, 2000;
Hornak et al., 2003; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2003, 2009; Singer et al.,
2004; Anderson et al., 2006; Lamm et al., 2007; Beadle, 2011).
The purpose of the current study is to investigate the contribu-
tion of the hippocampus to empathy. Whereas the hippocampus
and its core processing features have not previously been a focus of
empathy research, our motivation for their inclusion is based on
the role of the hippocampus in declarative (relational) memory
(Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001)
and a set of empirical findings with neurological patients with
hippocampal amnesia pointing to deficits in various aspects of
social behavior. In addition, we have heard anecdotal reports from
the family members of patients with amnesia that these individuals
have post-morbid changes in the ability to understand or predict
the thoughts and feelings of others, and to display compassion or
offer help to others in need, suggesting there may be disruptions
in empathy and prosocial behavior. Our overarching hypothesis,
elaborated below, is that the hippocampus is intimately tied to a
set of cognitive processes, and is a critical component of the net-
work of brain structures that supports aspects of social cognition.
Here we extend this proposal to examine the contribution of the
hippocampus to empathy.
HIPPOCAMPAL DECLARATIVE MEMORY AND EMPATHY
The role of the hippocampus (and related medial temporal lobe
structures) in the formation of new long-term memories and their
subsequent retrieval is well established. The hippocampus also
plays a critical role in support of declarative memory use. The hip-
pocampal declarative memory system has two processing features
or properties that are critical to our hypothesis for its role in social
cognition. First, declarative memory supports the flexible expres-
sion of memory (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Cohen, 1984; Squire,
1992; Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Bunsey and Eichenbaum,
1996; Dusek and Eichenbaum, 1997; Eichenbaum and Cohen,
2001). The representational flexibility of this form of memory per-
mits it to be accessible across processing systems (as when a rich,
multisensory autobiographical memory is evoked by the sight of
a familiar face or the sound of a familiar song) and to be used in
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novel situations. This flexibility permits memory to be called upon
promiscuously in supporting diverse and complex cognitive and
social capabilities. The second property of the hippocampal declar-
ative memory system is its support of relational memory binding
(Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Cohen et al., 1997; Ryan et al.,
2000; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001; Davachi, 2006), which per-
mits the encoding of memories of (even arbitrary) co-occurrences
of people, places, and things along with the spatial, temporal, and
interactional relations among them (see Konkel et al., 2008), that
constitute events, as well as representations of relationships among
events, providing the basis for the larger record of one’s experience.
Recent evidence has also emerged that the hippocampus plays a
role in on-line processing. Although most research on hippocam-
pal declarative memory, as with other forms of long-term memory,
has been on its role in the formation of new memories and sub-
sequent recollection, recent work by our lab and others (Hannula
et al., 2006; Olson et al., 2006; Barense et al., 2007; Hannula and
Ranganath, 2008; Warren et al., 2010) show that it is also crit-
ical for on-line processing, i.e., for acting on the present for the
present. The declarative memory system, via hippocampal-cortical
connections, is in ongoing interaction with various cortical pro-
cessing areas, as new information is perceived, as old information is
retrieved, and as processing outcomes are held on-line to be evalu-
ated, manipulated, and used in service of behavioral performance.
Taken together, the representational flexibility, relational memory
binding, and on-line processing afforded by the hippocampus in
support of declarative memory use may also support the capability
to manage the very complex social relationships and social inter-
actions that are a necessary part of successful social functioning in
the world.
Indeed, a growing body of research points to the hippocampus
and the declarative memory system as being important for various
types of social behavior. For instance, we have shown that hip-
pocampal amnesia impairs decision-making (Gupta et al., 2009a),
character judgments (Croft et al., 2010), and various aspects of
language and social discourse (Duff and Brown-Schmidt, 2012).
Patients with amnesia may also have difficulty establishing and
maintaining interpersonal relationships as they have smaller social
networks than age and sex matched healthy comparison partici-
pants (Gupta et al., 2009b; Davidson et al., 2012). These studies
suggest that deficits in the cognitive processes supported by the
hippocampus (e.g., representational flexibility, relational binding,
on-line processing) disrupt a core set of abilities necessary for
recognizing the shifting and changing status of friends and foes,
thinking about ourselves and other people, and communicating
events in the moment from time frames that stretch from the
distant past to possible futures. The extent to which these same
hippocampal dependent processes are also important for empathy
is an open question.
Empathy is defined by its cognitive and emotional components
(Davis, 1980, 1983; Batson, 1991; Eisenberg et al., 1994; Preston
and de Waal, 2002). The cognitive component of empathy sup-
ports our ability to understand the mental states of another person,
including their thoughts, intentions, and feelings. This involves
perspective-taking which entails imagining or simulating another
person’s mental state. Perspective taking is thought to involve the
flexible re-experiencing of relevant autobiographical memories
or semantic social knowledge about the situation or individual.
The emotional component of empathy supports our ability to
feel sympathy or compassion for another individual in need and
has been termed empathic concern. Empathic concern may involve
the processes of emotion contagion and emotional responsiveness,
enabling individuals to vicariously experience the emotions of
another person. Importantly, individuals often employ emotion
regulation in order to dampen their negative emotional arousal
due to experiencing others’ vicarious emotions (i.e., personal
distress) ultimately leading to the experience of empathic concern.
While we are agnostic regarding the main theories of empa-
thy, we speculate that the hippocampus and its related processes
could play a role in each. There are three main theories of empa-
thy: (1) theory–theory, (2) simulation theory, and an (3) adapted
simulation theory. Theory–theory purports that we discern others’
mental states by developing a theory about their behavior (Gopnik
and Wellman, 1992, 1994; Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997). The devel-
opment of a theory about others’ mental states may involve the
hippocampus to bind together social and emotional information
about the other person, the scenario, and the environmental loca-
tion and to hold this information on-line to make judgments and
comparisons. Such a role for the hippocampus would, in part, be
consistent with neuroimaging evidence suggesting hippocampal
recruitment in theory of mind,or the cognitive domain of empathy
(Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Spreng et al., 2009; Spreng and Mar,
2012). Whereas theory of mind is often linked to the frontal lobes,
Buckner and Carroll (2007) proposed that the processes by which
we project ourselves into a different time and place to remem-
ber our past are the same processes by which we project ourselves
into the future or into the mental states of others and this process
may involve the hippocampus. This projection of self into another
person’s mental state may reflect the process of perspective-taking
that occurs in the cognitive component of empathy. Additional
evidence that the hippocampus is important for self-projection
comes from a study that showed that patients with hippocampal
amnesia have difficulty imagining future events (Hassabis et al.,
2007). Other studies show that the hippocampus is involved in
tasks that require the flexible re-construction of previous memo-
ries or imagination of either new events in the future or others’
mental states (Spreng et al., 2009; Spreng and Grady, 2010; Spreng
and Mar, 2012).
Simulation theory suggests that the way in which we are able to
understand another person’s mental state is through internal sim-
ulation that occurs after we first comprehend their mental state
(Gordon, 1986; Heal, 1986). This pre-requisite understanding of
others’ mental states may recruit the hippocampus in a manner
similar to that for theory-theory. However, in order for an indi-
vidual to feel empathic concern for others who are suffering rather
than personal distress, individuals must regulate their emotions
and distinguish others’ emotions from one’s own. This process
may recruit the hippocampus as individuals must maintain on-
line their shared emotional experience, distinguish the relational
emotion-individual pairings experienced by the self and other, and
flexibly use personal memories to guide behavior in the moment.
It is also possible that certain social demands disproportionately
engage the hippocampus. Rabin and Rosenbaum (2012) demon-
strated that imagining or simulating the mental state of familiar or
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known individuals recruits the hippocampus to a greater degree
than for unknown individuals. The adaptation of simulation the-
ory defines the internal simulation process to be unconscious and
automatic rather than a conscious process requiring knowledge
about the mental state of the other person (Gallese, 2003; Gold-
man and Sripada, 2005; Gazzaniga, 2008). Considering this theory
in the context of emotional empathy and its subdomains would
suggest that the process by which individuals vicariously adopt the
emotions of others (i.e., emotion contagion and emotional respon-
siveness) would occur automatically and would not require intact
theory of mind. The hippocampus may be recruited to maintain
on-line and flexibly use emotional information about one’s own
emotional state and that of the other person to experience empa-
thy toward them. Previous research has demonstrated that the
hippocampus is involved in unconscious processing of relational
information (Ryan et al., 2000; Hannula and Ranganath, 2009;
Hannula and Green, 2012).
THE CURRENT STUDY
The current study extends our proposal about the role of the
hippocampus in social cognition to empathy. We conducted a
preliminary investigation of cognitive and emotional empathy in
patients with hippocampal damage and severe declarative memory
impairment. This consisted of an assessment of the subdomains
of empathy including perspective-taking, emotion contagion, emo-
tional responsiveness, and empathic concern. As a first pass at mea-
suring empathy in amnesia, we used the gold standard tools from
the field of social neuroscience, i.e., self-report questionnaires.
Building on our success using an emotion induction paradigm in
this same group of hippocampal patients (Feinstein et al., 2010),
we investigated the induction of empathy through two methods
adapted from standard empathy methodology (Batson et al., 1995;
Batson and Moran, 1999). We hypothesized that patients with
hippocampal amnesia would report lower empathy on trait ques-
tionnaires and measures of empathy after undergoing an empathy
induction than healthy comparison subjects.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
EXPERIMENT 1
Participants
Participants were three patients (one female) with bilateral damage
to the hippocampus and severe declarative memory impairment
and three healthy comparison participants matched pair-wise to
the amnesic patients on age, sex, handedness, and education (see
Table 1). The etiology for the patients was an anoxic/hypoxic event
(e.g., cardiac arrest, status epilepticus).
For patients 2363 and 1846, structural magnetic resonance
image (MRI) examination was completed confirming bilateral
hippocampal damage and significantly reduced hippocampal vol-
umes [studentized residual differences in hippocampal volume
relative to a matched comparison group were −2.6 and −4.24 z-
scores, respectively; (Allen et al., 2006)]. There was no evidence of
damage to the structure of the amygdala in either 1846 or 2363
(Allen et al., 2006; Warren et al., 2012). We do not have functional
connectivity data on these patients so we cannot comment on the
integrity of the functional connectivity between the hippocampus
and related structures. For patient 2563, anatomical analysis was
based on computerized tomography (he wears a pacemaker and
was unable to undergo MRI) and only damage in the hippocampal
region was visible.
Neuropsychological testing confirmed a selective and severe
memory impairment disproportionate to any deficits in general
cognitive or intellectual functioning (see Table 1). Performance
on the Wechsler Memory Scale-III (General Memory Index) was
at least 25 points lower than performance on the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale-III (Full Scale IQ; M=92.0), with an average
delay score on the memory scale (64.3) that was nearly 3 standard
deviations below population means. Basic speech and language
abilities were intact and all patients performed within normal
limits on standardized measures of language. Patients 2363 and
2563 indicated no evidence of depression on the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI). Responses on the BDI from 1846, the only female
participant, were interpreted as mild depression (see Warren et al.,
2012 for more information about 1846’s case).
Measures
Empathy is multidimensional in nature and includes cognitive
and emotional components. Empathy was assessed using four
self-report, trait measures including the Interpersonal Reactivity
Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), the Questionnaire Measure of Empathic
Tendency (QMET; Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972), the Empathy
Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004), and the
Emotion Contagion Scale (EC; Doherty, 1997). While the IRI and
EQ assess both components of empathy, the QMET and EC focus
on the emotional component of empathy. These questionnaires
have demonstrated high validity and reliability in healthy adult
Table 1 | Demographic and neuropsychological characteristics of hippocampal patients.
Patient Sex Onset
age
(years)
Testing
age
(years)
Edu
(years)
Chronicity
(years)
WAIS-III
FSIQ
WMS-III
GMI
Token
test
Boston
naming
test
BDI
1846 F 30 46 14 16 84 57 41 43 9
2563 M 45 54 16 9 94 63 44 52 0
2363 M 42 53 18 11 98 73 44 58 0
Mean (SD) 39.0 (7.9) 51.0 (4.4) 16.0 (2.0) 12.0 (3.6) 92.0 (7.2) 64.3 (7.2) 43.0 (1.7) 51.0 (7.5) 3 (5.2)
M, male; F, female; Edu, education;WAIS-III, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III; FSIQ, Full Scale Intelligence Quotient; WMS-III, Wechsler Memory Scale-III; GMI,
General Memory Index; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory.
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samples (for questionnaire details see below). Two of the patients
(1846 and 2363) were available to complete the questionnaires
for a second time at least 6 months after the initial testing session
allowing an assessment of test reliability. In general, this revealed
adequate reliability across testing sessions (see Table 2).
Participant data on the trait questionnaires was compared to
the healthy comparison participants from the present study (see
Table 3). As a secondary comparison, the participant data was also
compared with healthy control normative data available in the lit-
erature. A standardized z score was computed for each participant
that compared their raw score on the questionnaire to the mean
and standard deviation of the normative data set. Normative data
sets for these questionnaires consisted of individuals in the young
adulthood age range and participants were compared based upon
gender-specific norms. A z score was computed for the patient with
hippocampal damage as well as the family member and healthy
comparison participant. This is particularly important in the case
of our dataset because our present sample is somewhat older than
the young adulthood range found in most normative studies. The
comparison data sets included: (Davis, 1980; IRI), (Lawrence et al.,
2004; EQ sum score), (Lawrence et al., 2007; EQ factor scores),
(Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972; QMET), and (Doherty, 1997; EC).
When available, a qualitative comparison of the participant data
was made with an older adult sample that was similar in age to the
participants.
Interpersonal Reactivity Index. The IRI (Davis, 1980) is one
of the few empathy questionnaires designed to measure empathy
as a multidimensional construct in healthy adults. The IRI has
four subscales measuring an individual’s perception of their abil-
ity in each of these domains: Perspective Taking (PT-adopting
the mental perspective of another person), Empathic Concern
(EC-experiencing feelings of compassion for others), Fantasy (FS-
adopting the perspective of a fictional character in a book or
Table 2 |Trait empathy: reliability.
Measures 1846 1846
Re-test
Diff
score
2363 2363
Re-test
Diff
score
IRI-PT 16 15 1 17 21 −4
IRI-EC 19 23 −4 19 19 0
IRI-FS 7 11 −4 21 19 2
IRI-PD 19 17 2 12 12 0
EQ-sum 47 46 1 42 50 −8
EQ-cog 11 10 1 11 11 0
EQ-emot 14 13 1 7 11 −4
EQ-soc 6 5 1 5 7 −2
QMET 36 54 −18 17 19 −2
EC 2.93 3.33 −.40 2.53 2.73 −.20
IRI-PT, Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)-Perspective-Taking Subscale; IRI-EC,
IRI Empathic Concern subscale; IRI-FS, IRI Fantasy subscale; IRI-PD, IRI Per-
sonal Distress Subscale; EQ, Empathy Quotient (EQ); EQ-Sum, total score on EQ;
EQ-Cog, EQ Cognitive Empathy Factor; EQ-Emot, EQ Emotional Reactivity Fac-
tor; EQ-Soc, EQ Social Skills Factor; QMET, Questionnaire Measure of Empathic
Tendency; EC, Emotion Contagion Scale; Diff score, Initial testing – Re-test score.
movie), and Personal Distress (PD-feeling unease or distress in
the face of the physical or emotional harm of another person).
Each subscale contains 7 items that are summed to create a
total score for each subscale with ranges from 0 to 28 points,
with higher scores indicating greater empathy. The IRI has ade-
quate test/re-test reliability across its four subscales in healthy
adults (range: r=.61 to .81; test/re-test interval: 60–75 days)
and the subscales have adequate internal consistency (PT: Cron-
bach’s α: males=.71, females=.75; EC: Cronbach’s α: males=.68,
females=.73; FS: Cronbach’s α: males=.78, females=.79; PD:
Cronbach’s α: males=.77, females=.75.)
Cognitive empathy is measured by the PT subscale through
such items as, “When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to ‘put
myself in his shoes’ for awhile.” An example item from the FS sub-
scale includes, “When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I
imagine how I would feel if the events in the story were happening
to me.”For the EC subscale an example item includes,“I often have
tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.” The
PD subscale measures vicarious negative arousal resulting from
viewing another person’s emotional or physical distress, for exam-
ple, “I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very
emotional situation.”
Empathy Quotient. The Empathy Quotient (EQ) was developed
to assess dispositional empathy in individuals with Asperger’s
Syndrome/High Functioning Autism and in healthy adults (Baron-
Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004). The scale has sufficient test/re-
test reliability in healthy adults (r=.84; test/re-test interval: 10–
12 months; Lawrence et al., 2004) and adequate internal valid-
ity (Cronbach’s α=.92; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004).
Although originally designed to measure empathy as a uni-
dimensional construct, a recent factor analysis has revealed that it
may measure three factors: Cognitive Empathy, Emotional Reac-
tivity, and Social Skills (Lawrence et al., 2004). Total scores are com-
puted by summing responses to all of the items, while factor scores
involve summing items that measure a particular factor. The range
of total scores is from 0 to 80 points, with higher scores indicating
greater empathy. While cognitive empathy is assessed by the Cogni-
tive Empathy Factor and includes such items as,“I am good at pre-
dicting how someone will feel,” emotional empathy is measured by
the Emotional Reactivity factor through items such as,“I get upset
if I see people suffering on news programs.”Emotional empathy as
measured by this scale is more similar to the construct of emotion
contagion than sympathy. The Social Skills factor does not measure
empathy but rather assesses individuals’perceptions of their ability
to interact socially with others, for example,“I find it hard to know
what to do in a social situation” (which is a reverse-scored item).
Questionnaire Measure of Empathic Tendency. The Question-
naire Measure of Empathic Tendency (QMET) was designed
to measure dispositional emotional empathy in healthy adults
(Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972). The split-half reliability for this
scale in healthy adults is .84. The QMET has demonstrated
good construct validity in healthy adults through its associa-
tion with other measures of empathy such as the IRI-EC [males:
r(225)=.63, p<.05, females: r(235)=.56, p<.05] and the IRI-PT
[males: r(225)=.22, p<.05; females: r(235)=.17, p<.05; Davis,
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Table 3 |Trait empathy.
Participant Measure
IRI EQ QMET EC
PT EC FS PD Total Cog Emot Soc Total Total
1846 Patient Raw 16 19 7 19 47 11 14 6 36 2.93
z −.40 −.70 −2.27 1.34 −.39 2.33 3.95 −.16 −.38 −1.46
Family Raw 7 16 2 19 25 2 5 4 16 2.47
z −2.26 −1.48 −3.24 1.34 −2.78 −2.67 −.79 −.96 −1.33 −2.31
NC Raw 24 22 14 16 51 13 10 9 83 3.00
Z 1.25 .09 −.92 .74 .04 3.44 1.84 1.04 1.86 −1.33
P–F score 9 3 5 0 22 9 9 2 20 .46
2363 Patient Raw 17 19 21 12 42 11 7 5 17 2.53
z .05 −.01 .94 .56 .07 3.39 .72 −.40 −.27 −1.60
Family Raw 16 25 13 16 29 4 9 3 20 2.20
z −.17 1.42 −.49 1.44 −1.22 −.50 1.41 −1.20 −.14 −2.23
NC Raw 21 24 19 11 55 10 14 5 86 3.53
z .89 1.18 .58 .34 1.36 2.83 3.14 −.40 2.86 .33
P–F score 1 −6 8 −4 13 7 −2 2 −3 .33
2563 Patient Raw 11 23 7 1 51 9 12 10 14 2.13
z −1.22 .94 −1.56 −1.86 .96 2.28 2.45 1.60 −.41 −2.37
NC Raw 21 23 25 22 59 12 16 8 53 2.93
z .89 .94 1.66 2.76 1.75 3.94 3.83 .80 1.36 −.83
HC M 14.67 20.33 11.67 10.67 46.67 10.33 11.00 7.00 22.33 2.53
GRP SD 3.21 2.31 8.08 9.07 4.51 1.15 3.61 2.65 11.93 .40
NC M 22.00 23.00 19.33 16.33 55.00 11.67 13.33 7.33 74.00 3.15
GRP SD 1.73 1.00 5.51 5.51 4.00 1.53 3.06 2.08 18.25 .33
HC GRP, group of patients with hippocampal damage; NC GRP, group of normal healthy comparison participants; NC, each normal, healthy comparison participant
matched to a particular patient; Raw, raw sum score on each questionnaire; Z, standardized score on each questionnaire based upon the mean and standard devi-
ation of a normative control sample from the literature; P–F score, Patient–Family member raw score on questionnaire; IRI, Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI); PT,
Perspective-Taking Subscale of IRI; EC, Empathic Concern subscale of IRI; FS, Fantasy subscale of IRI; PD, Personal Distress Subscale of IRI; EQ, Empathy Quotient;
Sum, total score on EQ; Cog, Cognitive Empathy Factor of EQ; Emot, Emotional Reactivity Factor of EQ; Soc, Social Skills Factor of EQ; QMET, Questionnaire Measure
of Empathic Tendency; EC, Emotion Contagion Scale.
1983]. Because the scale measures vicarious emotional respon-
siveness to others, it is more similar to the emotion contagion
construct than to sympathy. Emotional empathy is assessed by
computing a total sum score on the thirty-three items on the ques-
tionnaire, some of which are negatively worded and thus reverse
scored. The response scale ranges from−4 (“I strongly disagree”)
to +4 (“I strongly agree”) and is anchored at 0 with a range of
scores from−132 (lowest empathy) to+132 points (highest empa-
thy). Although initially designed to be separated into subscales, it
was shown that the best fit is a uni-dimensional measure of emo-
tional empathy. A couple of example items include: “I tend to
get emotionally involved with a friend’s problems,” and, “Seeing
people cry upsets me.”
Emotion Contagion Scale. The Emotion Contagion Scale (EC)
measures one’s tendency to vicariously experience the emotions
of others in daily life and measures emotion contagion (Doherty,
1997). In healthy adults, this scale has shown adequate test-retest
reliability [r(41)=.84, p<.001, over a three week interval] and
high internal consistency (Cronbach’s α=.90). The EC scale shows
moderate associations with other measures of emotional empa-
thy, such as the IRI-EC [r(119)=.37, p<.05] and the QMET
[r(80)=.47, p<.05]. The EC scale measures emotion contagion
as a uni-dimensional construct through fifteen positively scored
items. The response choices range from 1 (“Never”), 2 (“Rarely”),
3 (“Often”), and 4 (“Always”), and the average score of the items
is computed, with higher scores indicating greater emotion con-
tagion. A few example items from the scale are, “If someone I’m
talking with begins to cry, I get teary-eyed” and, “I get filled with
sorrow when people talk about the death of their loved ones.”
RESULTS
TRAIT COGNITIVE EMPATHY
On the Perspective Taking subscale of the IRI (IRI-PT), which
assesses one’s ability to adopt the mental perspective of others,
all three hippocampal participants (1846, 2363, 2563) reported
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lower scores on this measure than healthy comparison partici-
pants (see Table 3). In fact, the patients’ ratings were 3 standard
deviations (SD) or more below that of the three demographically
matched healthy comparison participants (1846: 3.47 SD; 2363:
2.89 SD; 2563: 6.35 SD). The group of hippocampal patients were
significantly different from the healthy comparison group on this
measure [Mann–Whitney: z(4)=1.99, p<.05]. The family mem-
bers of two of the amnesic patients (1846 and 2363) reported the
patients as having even lower PT scores than the patients them-
selves reported (difference score: patient score – family member
score: 1846= 9 points; 2363= 1 point). We were unable to obtain
family member ratings for patient 2563.
Next, we compared the participants’ scores on the IRI-PT to
a normative dataset of healthy adults (Davis, 1980). All of the
matched comparison participants had positive z scores ranging
from approximately+1 SD to+1.25. In comparison, the patients’
z scores were negative in 2 out of 3 cases (1846:−.40, 2563:−1.22,
2363: .05). Furthermore, where family member scores were avail-
able, their z scores were more negative than the reports of the
patients (1846: −2.26, 2363: −.17). In an effort to also compare
the patients to a more similar age cohort, the patients’ responses
were compared to a previous paper examining trait empathy in
older adults (age: M=66.2, SD= 7.6; range= 55–81 years; Beadle
et al., 2012). The patients with hippocampal damage in the present
study were slightly younger (M=51, SD=4.4 years). This previous
paper demonstrated that older adults report lower cognitive empa-
thy than younger adults (Beadle et al., 2012). For this comparison,
the hippocampal group was approximately 1 SD below the group
of older adults, suggesting that their reported scores are not sim-
ply an effect of age (hippocampal patients: M=14.7; older control
group: N=20, M=17.7, SD=3.4).
The EQ cognitive empathy scale measures one’s ability to accu-
rately predict others’ mental states. Two out of three patients with
hippocampal amnesia reported lower scores (1846, 2563) than
the demographically matched healthy comparison participants on
this scale. Relative to the mean of the healthy comparison par-
ticipants, 2563 was 1.7 SD lower, while 1846’s score was within
1 SD from the comparison group mean. As a group, however,
the amnesic patients did not differ from healthy participants on
the EQ cognitive empathy factor [z(4)=1.11, p=.27]. Because the
family members of patients 1846 and 2363 reported the patients
as having much lower cognitive empathy than the patients’ own
ratings (difference score: 1846=9 points; 2363=7 points), it sug-
gests that the patients’ own ratings may not be completely accurate
in this case. In comparison to standard normative data (Lawrence
et al., 2007), healthy comparison participants had positive z scores
ranging from+2.83 to+3.94 SD, while the family member ratings
of the patients were both negative (1846F:−2.67, 2363F:−.50).
TRAIT EMOTIONAL EMPATHY
Emotional responsiveness to others, one domain of emotional
empathy, was reported to be low in all three amnesic participants
relative to the healthy comparison participants on the Question-
naire Measure of Empathic Tendency (QMET; see Table 3). The
amnesic patients were at least 2 SD lower than the healthy com-
parison participants’ mean (1846: 2.10 SD, 2363: 3.10 SD, 2563:
3.30 SD), a difference that was marginally significant [z(4)=1.96,
p=.05]. Family members rated the patients as slightly higher than
the patients’ own ratings in one case (2363: patient=17, fam-
ily member=20), and quite a bit lower in another case (1846:
patient=36, family member=16). In comparison to a normative
data set (Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972), the patients and the family
member reports resulted in negative z scores (range: patient=−.41
to −.27; family member=−1.33 to −.14). In contrast, healthy
comparison participants all had positive z scores (range: 1.36 to
2.86).
For the EQ Emotional Reactivity Factor, which also measures
emotional responsiveness to others, two out of three amnesic
participants were lower than the healthy comparison partici-
pants. Of the two hippocampal amnesic participants, one had a
score 2 SD away from the mean of the demographically matched
healthy comparison participant group (2363) and the other patient
was .4 SD lower (2563). As a group, the hippocampal patients
did not significantly differ from the demographically matched
healthy comparison participants on the EQ Emotional Reactiv-
ity Factor [z(4)=.89, p=.38]. The family member of 2363 rated
the patient 2 points higher than the patient’s own rating, while
the family member for 1846 rated the patient 9 points lower.
Relative to a normative dataset (Lawrence et al., 2007), 2363
and 2563 had qualitatively lower z scores than their matched
comparison participants (2363=.72, 2363C=3.14; 2563=2.45,
2563C=3.83).
Two out of three participants with amnesia were also low
relative to the healthy comparison participants on another mea-
sure of emotional responsiveness that assesses primitive emotional
contagion toward others (Emotion Contagion Scale), with scores
approximately 2 SD or more lower than the healthy comparison
participant mean (2363: 1.90 SD; 2563: 3.10 SD). Hippocam-
pal patients as a group did not differ significantly from the
demographically matched healthy comparison participants on
the EC [z(4)=1.77, p=.08]. For both 1846 and 2363, the fam-
ily members of these patients rated them as having lower levels of
emotion contagion than the patients themselves reported (1846:
patient=2.93, family member=2.47; 2363: patient=2.53, family
member=2.20). In terms of the patients’ scores relative to nor-
mative data (Doherty, 1997), patients had lower z scores than the
matched comparison participants (1846=−1.46, 1846C=−1.33,
2363=−1.6, 2363C=.33, 2563=−2.37, 2563C=−.83). Further-
more, patients’ family members z scores were even lower than
the patients’ (1846F=−2.31, 2363F=−2.23).
Sympathy or compassion toward others in need was measured
by the IRI Empathic Concern subscale. On this subscale, two out of
three participants with amnesia reported lower scores (1846, 2363)
than the healthy comparison participants. The scores of 1846 and
2363 were 4 SD lower than the healthy comparison participants
mean. When comparing the group of hippocampal patients to the
healthy comparison participants, there were no significant differ-
ences [z(4)=1.35, p=.18]. In terms of the family member ratings
from the present study, 1846’s family member reported slightly
lower scores than the patient (1846=19, family member=16),
while 2363’s family member reported slightly higher scores than
the patient (2363=19, family member=25). A comparison to a
normative dataset of younger adults (Davis, 1980) revealed that
1846, based upon self and family member ratings, had z scores
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that were lower than that of their matched comparison partici-
pant (1846=−.70, 1846F=−1.48, 1846C=.09). The z scores for
2363 and 2563 did not show a consistent pattern (2363=−.01,
2363F=1.42, 2363C=1.18; 2563=.94, 2563C=.94). Compared to
data from a group of older adults, the mean of the hippocampal
group was similar to that of the older adult control mean (hip-
pocampal amnesic: M=20.30, healthy older adult control mean:
M=20.78, SD=2.64; Beadle et al., 2012).
INTERIM DISCUSSION
These results provide preliminary evidence for lower trait cogni-
tive and emotional empathy on some measures in patients with
hippocampal amnesia than in healthy comparison participants,
both matched to the patients and group norms in the literature.
However, given that all of these measures rely on self-report, we
were concerned that the extent of the patients’ memory impair-
ment may have influenced their ability to accurately report their
experience of cognitive and emotional empathy. These question-
naires likely require some degree of declarative memory to recall
how one responded in a particular situation in the past or to imag-
ine how one might respond in the future. The consistency of the
patients’ reports alleviate some of these concerns, as do the family
member reports of the patients’ empathy. The reports from the
patients’ family members were largely consistent with the patients’
own reports of lower empathy. In fact, in line with their anecdo-
tal reports, the family member reports were actually slightly lower
than those of the patients in several cases, suggesting an observable
deficit in empathy. Furthermore, in addition to age-matched com-
parison data, we also compared the amnesic patients’ ratings to
norms from healthy older adults who are assumed to have experi-
enced age-related changes to hippocampal function. The amnesic
patients had even lower levels of empathy than these older adults
in the case of cognitive empathy. That said, we were still con-
cerned about the limitations of the questionnaires as well as our
low number of participants and the variability across measures
(i.e., not all patients were lower on all questionnaires) and sought
a more objective measure of empathy.
In a second experiment, we conducted a behavioral study that
assessed the induction of empathy and measurement of prosocial
behavior in hippocampal amnesia. In previous work in our lab,
these same amnesic patients underwent an emotion (happiness,
sadness) induction procedure (using affectively-laden film clips)
to ascertain whether their experience of a basic emotion would
persist beyond their memory for the sadness-inducing films (Fein-
stein et al., 2010). The induction procedures were successful as the
patients reported higher levels of the target emotion long after they
were able to recall any information about the film clips. Building
upon this previous study, we measured the level of empathy par-
ticipants reported after undergoing an empathic induction and
the prosocial behavior they demonstrated after experiencing the
induction.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
EXPERIMENT 2
Participants
Two participants with hippocampal amnesia from Experiment
1 (1846 and 2363) were available to complete Experiment 2A
and B over two separate testing sessions. In Experiment 2A, the
behavior of these patients was compared to healthy comparison
participants matched to the patients on age, sex, handedness, and
education1. For Experiment 2B, the performance of the hippocam-
pal amnesic participants was compared to a separate group of 7
healthy comparison participants (4 females, 3 males) matched to
the hippocampal patients on age and education.
EXPERIMENT 2A
Measures
Empathy induction through audio recording. We adapted an
empathy induction procedure from Beadle (2011) where partic-
ipants listened to two audio recordings that included a neutral
condition and an empathy condition. In the original version of
the procedure, participants were told they were overhearing a con-
versation between their opponents in an economic game and a
research assistant over a speakerphone. Here, participants listened
to the exact same recording but were told that they were in fact lis-
tening to an audio recording. In pilot studies of these two versions
of the task (overhearing vs. recording), we found the two versions
to be comparable in their effectiveness in inducing empathy in 12
healthy adults (25–62 years; see Beadle, 2011 for details).
The premise of the audio recordings were that they were taped
conversations between a female Research Assistant in her 20’s inter-
acting with a series of two participants in a previously conducted
experiment and each of the participants were men of approxi-
mately 55 years of age. The Research Assistant made “small-talk”
with participants and asked about their day as they were prepar-
ing to begin the experiment. In reality, these audio recordings
were performed in a sound studio by a series of community
theater actors and a graduate student serving in the role of the
Research Assistant. In the neutral conversation, a man talks about
the events that occurred in his day thus far which included read-
ing the newspaper over breakfast and talking with his wife. The
empathy-inducing conversation begins with a man talking about
his day and describing how he played a card game, when he reveals
that it is the anniversary of his son’s death and demonstrates his
deep anguish and grief over his loss.
Empathy ratings. Immediately before and after listening to each
audio recording, participants completed a self-report question-
naire consisting of items that assessed participants’ current level of
empathy, as well as other positive and negative emotions (Beadle,
2011). Adapted from the instructions for the Positive and Negative
Affective Schedule (PANAS; Watson and Clark, 1994), participants
were asked to perform ratings based upon a series of items follow-
ing the prompt,“Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now,
that is, at the present moment” on a rating scale that ranged from 1
(“very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“extremely.”) The empathy items
on this questionnaire were derived from the emotional response
scale that has been used to measure empathic concern in a vari-
ety of empathy induction studies in young adults (Batson, 1987,
1The healthy comparison participant matched to 2363 in Experiment 1 was no
longer available at the time of Experiment 2, and thus a different healthy compari-
son participant that was matched to 2363 on demographic characteristics completed
Experiment 2A.
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1991). The specific items that measured empathy in the present
study included “sympathetic” and “compassionate.” Also drawn
from Batson and colleagues emotional response scale were items
measuring the social emotion of personal distress. In addition,
items were drawn from the PANAS that assessed sadness, hostility,
and joviality (Watson and Clark, 1994). Two items were used to
measure each domain of emotion (empathy, sadness, joviality, hos-
tility, and personal distress), and then within each individual the
two responses were averaged. To determine the level of empathy
specifically produced by the empathy induction,a change score was
calculated that accounted for baseline ratings prior to each induc-
tion as well as due to the neutral condition [Empathy Change
Score= (After – Before Empathy Induction) – (After – Before
Neutral Induction)].
EXPERIMENT 2B
Measures
Empathy induction through note. The second experiment (Part
B) also involved an empathy induction, but in this case empathy
was induced in participants through a written note rather than
an audio recording. In addition, participants’ prosocial behavior
was measured in response to the empathy induction. Participants
were told that the purpose of the study was to play an economic
game against two other participants, one at a time. This paradigm
was employed in a previous study of healthy younger and older
adults (Beadle et al, under review). Out of the three participants,
two would serve in the role of the “Sender,” meaning that they
would be asked to write a note about something interesting that
recently happened to them, and one of them would be in the role
of the “Receiver” who would read the notes from the opponents
immediately prior to playing them in a series of economic games.
The use of notes to induce empathy in an economic game context
was adapted from methodology by Batson and colleagues (Batson
et al., 1995; Batson and Moran, 1999), while the specific content
of the notes used in this experiment was the same as that used by
Beadle and colleagues (Beadle et al, under review). The content of
the empathy induction note consisted of the participant describ-
ing that they recently found out they have a potentially fatal form
of skin cancer, and their thoughts and feelings as they attempted to
cope with this news. In the neutral note, the participant describes
a series of errands they completed in the downtown area, and
then in order to make the arousal level more similar to that of the
empathy note, the participant discusses being followed on the free-
way by another car that eventually drives away. The participants
performed empathy ratings immediately prior to reading each
note and immediately afterward. The self-report scale used in this
experiment was the same as the one described in Experiment 2A.
Empathy and prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior was mea-
sured as the amount of money ($) given to a game opponent on
a standard economic game, the Dictator Game, in response to
the neutral condition and the empathy condition. In the Dictator
Game, the participant must decide how they would like to split
$10 with their game opponent, and their opponent must accept
any offer amount. The participant who is splitting the money must
follow a few rules: (1) the split must add up to $10; (2) the offer
must be in dollar increments; and (3) the offer must range between
$1–9. Behavior on the dictator game due to the empathy condition
was compared to the control neutral condition.
RESULTS
EMPATHY RATINGS
Empathy induction through audio recording
In comparing the empathy ratings in response to the neutral and
empathy conditions, 2363 and 1846 had an empathy change score
of 0, indicating that the empathy condition did not produce greater
empathy ratings than the neutral condition in these patients (see
Table 4). The healthy comparison participant matched to 1846
showed an empathy change score of a 2 point increase due to the
empathy induction (vs. the neutral induction) and the healthy
comparison participant for 2363 showed an increase in empathy
of 1 point.
Empathy induction through note
Participants with hippocampal amnesia reported experiencing
lower empathy after undergoing an empathy induction (see
Table 4) than a group of healthy comparison participants. Specif-
ically, 1846 had a change score of 0 from her ratings on the
empathy condition vs. the neutral condition, and this was less than
1 SD away from the healthy comparison group mean (M=1.43,
SD=1.59, Median=1). Participant 2363’s change score included
a decrease of 1.5 points in empathy in comparison to the neutral
condition and this was approximately 2 SD’s away from the healthy
comparison group mean.
EMPATHY AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR
Hippocampal amnesic participants gave no more money to their
game opponent in the neutral condition than in the empathy con-
dition, and this differed from the group of healthy comparison
participants who gave more money in the empathy condition
than the neutral condition. 1846 gave $4 in the neutral condi-
tion and $4 in the empathy condition, while 2363 offered $6
in the neutral condition and $6 in the empathy condition. The
healthy comparison participants gave on average $4.14 in the neu-
tral condition (SD=1.68) and $5.71 in the empathy condition
(SD=1.25). 1846 and 2363 showed no difference between the
amount of money they gave in the neutral and empathy con-
ditions ($0 change score), while the healthy comparison group
gave on average $1.57 (SD=1.62, Median=$2) more in the empa-
thy condition than in the neutral condition. The hippocampal
amnesic participants’ responses were about 1 SD away from the
healthy comparison group mean.
DISCUSSION
We propose that the hippocampus is intimately tied to a set of
cognitive processes, and is a critical component of the network of
brain structures, that supports aspects of social cognition. Here,
we extended this proposal to test a hypothesis about the role of
the hippocampus in empathy. We found preliminary evidence
that hippocampal amnesia is associated with reduced cognitive
and emotional empathy relative to healthy comparison partici-
pants. Patients with hippocampal amnesia had lower ratings of
trait empathy on self-report questionnaires of both cognitive and
emotional empathy when compared to healthy demographically
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Table 4 | Empathy inductions: ratings.
Rating Exp. type Neutral condition Empathy condition
1846 1846C 2363 2363C NC M (SD) 1846 1846C 2363 2363C NC M (SD)
EC Recording .50 .00 .00 .00 .00 (.00) .50 2.00 .00 1.00 1.50 (.71)
Note −.50 NA .50 NA −.36 (1.21) −.50 NA −1.00 NA 1.07 (.67)
HOS Recording .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 (.00) .50 .00 .00 .00 .00 (.00)
Note .00 NA .00 NA .50 (1.12) .00 NA .00 NA .14 (.38)
JOV Recording −1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 (.00) −1.50 −.50 −3.00 −.50 −.50 (.00)
Note .00 NA .00 NA −.64 (1.14) −.50 NA .00 NA −1.00 (.96)
PD Recording −1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 (.00) −.50 .00 1.00 .00 .00 (.00)
Note .00 NA .00 NA .50 (1.00) −1.00 NA .00 NA 1.21 (1.58)
SAD Recording −.50 .00 .00 .00 .00 (.00) 1.00 1.00 1.00 .50 .75 (.35)
Note .00 NA .00 NA −.07 (.73) −1.00 NA .00 NA 1.29 (1.11)
Values represent change scores of participants’ self-report ratings completed immediately before and immediately after each type of induction. Change score, Rating
After – Before Condition (Neutral or Empathy); EC, empathic concern subscale; HOS, hostility subscale; JOV, joviality subscale; PD, personal distress subscale; SAD,
sadness subscale; Exp., Experiment; C, healthy matched comparison participant rating; NC, for recording study: represents the mean of the normal, healthy matched
comparison participants (N=2). For note study: represents the mean of the healthy comparison group (N=7). NA, not applicable.
matched participants, normative data of healthy younger adults,
and to older adults who are assumed to have experienced age-
related changes to hippocampal function. These self-ratings were
consistent with family member ratings, which were either equal
to or lower than that of the patients themselves in the majority
of cases. Results from the behavioral empathy studies corrob-
orate the self-report data providing preliminary evidence that
the hippocampus may be necessary for some aspects of healthy
empathy.
A growing body of work suggests that hippocampal memory
processes contribute to a variety of other cognitive domains. At the
heart of proposals regarding how the hippocampus contributes to
capabilities as diverse as visual perception, problem solving, and
language processing, to name a few, is the functionality and core
processing features of the hippocampus. Here we have expanded
the reach of the hippocampus to the neural network that supports
social cognition and empathy. Linking disruptions in empathy to
the hippocampus demonstrates how promiscuously the hallmark
processing features of the hippocampus are used in service of a
variety of cognitive domains.
Like other complex behaviors, empathy requires the coordina-
tion and orchestration of cognitive and neural systems. Empathy
is characterized by the fact that its diverse components must func-
tion together in a relational, flexible, and on-line manner in order
for effective empathic responding to occur. For instance, in terms
of cognitive empathy, the process of perspective-taking necessi-
tates the flexible integration and retrieval of previously acquired
memories and social knowledge relevant to the situation in order
to imagine and predict the mental state of another person. For
emotional empathy, an important interplay must occur between
an individual’s vicarious emotional response to another person’s
emotional state and adequate emotion regulation of that state
in order to experience empathic concern for the other person.
This process is likely to require on-line monitoring and updating
of one’s own and others’ emotional states. We have argued that
the functionality of the hippocampus, in its support of relational
binding, representational flexibility, and on-line processing, is well
suited to meeting the demands of some aspects of empathy.
While the inclusion of the hippocampus to the neural net-
work of social cognition is supported by our preliminary results
on empathy disruptions in patients with hippocampal amnesia, it
also raises a number of interesting and open questions about the
nature and timing of hippocampal contributions and the interac-
tions with the rest of the network. It will be informative in future
work to differentiate the contributions of distinct neural and cog-
nitive systems to empathy and the patterns of impairments in
patients with selective damage across the empathy network. For
example, with respect to hippocampal contributions, the ability
to recognize, process, and experience basic emotions appears to
be independent of the hippocampus and instead would be the
purview of other neural systems (e.g., amygdala). However, once
the processing demands of empathy require the binding of this
information to a person and a context, the continuous updating
of information, and the flexible deployment of this information
in dynamic and evolving situations, patients with hippocampal
amnesia are particularly challenged.
While it makes good sense that hippocampal damage and pro-
found amnesia would significantly impair the acquisition and
updating of new social information, can the patients rely on their
remote episodic and semantic knowledge, that is often judged to
be intact, to produce an appropriate empathic response in some
contexts? The patients would certainly be in a better position to
marshal information from their remote autobiographical memory
in service of producing an appropriate empathic response than if
they had to rely exclusively on information acquired in the recent
past, in the window of their anterograde amnesia. The question,
however, is would that remote knowledge be sufficient? And, would
the result be the same as someone without hippocampal damage?
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While we are unaware of any evidence that directly addresses this,
we would speculate that the patients with hippocampal amne-
sia would still be disadvantaged and would not produce a fully
normal empathic response relying on remote autobiographical
memory alone. One reason for this line of thinking is that the
hippocampus plays a role in the flexible manipulation and use of
declarative memory. That is, even if representations of a previous
empathic response were retrieved from memory, there are still hip-
pocampal contributions, as the use of the reconstructed episode
would require the active maintenance of relational information as
judgments and comparisons are made between the previous and
current situation. These are certainly interesting and open ques-
tions for future work on empathy and on the nature of preserved
episodic memory more broadly.
Recent literature has suggested that during the process of
perspective-taking the hippocampus may show greater recruit-
ment when thinking about the mental states of others who are
more similar to us (or known) or in situations that we have
encountered (Perry et al., 2011; Rabin and Rosenbaum, 2012).
It is thought that the hippocampus may show greater recruitment
because the individual may have more relevant personal memo-
ries that can serve as a guide in predicting the mental state of a
known other (Rabin and Rosenbaum, 2012). On the other hand,
there is some evidence for a reduced role for the hippocampus in
understanding the mental states of strangers (Rosenbaum et al.,
2007). While this question was not addressed specifically in our
study, there is some evidence for disruption in thinking about the
mental states of close others (as measured by the questionnaires)
and strangers (as measured by the empathy induction). Anecdotal
reports by the family members about their ability to detect oth-
ers’ mental states, suggest that they have difficulty detecting the
thoughts and feelings of their family members. Given the nature
of the measures and the limited amount of data, of course, we
cannot say if there is a disproportional contribution of the hip-
pocampus to thinking about strangers or close others, but this
remains an interesting question for future research.
It is likely that non-declarative forms of memory contribute to
some aspects of empathy. Indeed, non-declarative forms of mem-
ory such as priming have been evoked to account for a range of
social phenomena (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Milne and Graf-
man, 2001; Garrod and Pickering, 2009) and may contribute at
some level to the complex set of processes that result in an empathic
response. Understanding the interaction and time course of mem-
ory systems with other neural systems critical for social behavior
will further our conceptualization of the network supporting the
social brain.
While this study offers preliminary support for the notion that
the hippocampus contributes to the neural network supporting
empathy, there are certain caveats and limitations of the study that
should be noted. The hippocampal patients did not report elevated
levels of empathy following the induction protocol using two sep-
arate methods of empathy induction conducted on two separate
occasions. However, these same induction procedures were suc-
cessful in inducing empathy in healthy comparison participants
(Beadle, 2011; Beadle et al, under review) and in individuals with
frontal lobe damage in another study (Beadle, 2011). This result is
also in contrast to our previous work inducing happiness and sad-
ness in patients with hippocampal amnesia (Feinstein et al., 2010).
Nevertheless, the amnesic patients did not report elevated empathy
and thus we did not see an increase in prosocial behavior. While
methodological differences in the induction protocols should be
considered further, we are intrigued by the possibility that the hip-
pocampus may not be required for the experience (and induction)
of basic emotions but that it is required for social emotions such
as empathy. Already there is some evidence that social emotions
may recruit a different neural system than basic emotions (Moll
et al., 2002). The hippocampus may be recruited for the process-
ing of social information and emotions due to its role in relational
thinking, i.e., thinking about others’ mental states and retrieving
relevant autobiographical memories to understand others. Future
work to explore this idea is warranted. The small sample size and
the lack of familiar partner ratings of empathy from the healthy
comparison participants are also limitations. Future replication
and extension of this work is needed.
The goal of the current work was to argue for the inclusion of
the hippocampus in the larger neural network supporting social
behavior and empathy. Our preliminary results suggesting that
hippocampal damage produces a deficit in empathy have implica-
tions for studying empathy in other populations where hippocam-
pal pathology and declarative memory impairments are common
(e.g., normal aging, Alzheimer’s Disease and other dementias,
schizophrenia, and Traumatic Brain Injury). Indeed, because the
hippocampus has not routinely been considered to be a signifi-
cant part of the network critical for social behavior, such deficits
are seldom attributed to the impairments in declarative memory
that are a hallmark in so many patients that also have deficits in
empathy.
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